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Jacob K. Goeree, Philippos Louis, and Jingjing Zhang1 
July 8, 2019 
Summary 
Majority voting is the predominant mechanism for collective decision making. However, 
majority voting is generally not efficient as it does not allow voters to express the 
intensity of their preferences.  In addition, majority voting suffers from the “tyranny of the 
majority,” i.e. the risk of repeatedly excluding minority groups from representation. A final 
drawback is the “winner-take-all” nature of majority voting, i.e. it offers no compensation for 
losing voters. Economists have recently proposed various alternative mechanisms that aim to 
produce more efficient and more equitable outcomes.  Under storable voting, voters allocate a 
budget of votes across several issues. Under vote trading, voters can exchange votes for money. 
Under linear voting or quadratic voting, voters can buy votes at a linear or quadratic cost 
respectively.  These alternative mechanisms hold the promise to improve on majority voting 
but have their own shortcomings.  Additional theoretical analysis and empirical testing is 
needed to produce a mechanism that robustly delivers efficient and equitable outcomes. 
Keywords: electoral design, inefficient voting, storable votes, vote trading, linear voting, quadratic voting, 
experiments 
1. Majority voting
The most popular decision rule in groups when making a binary decision is majority voting.
Majority voting is popular across the full spectrum of human groups from hunter-gatherer tribal 
societies (Boehm, 1996; Boyd and Richerson, 1988; Wilson, 1994) to modern industrial 
democracies (Mueller, 1989). It is the decision rule most frequently adopted to make formal social 
choices in elections, legislatures, and committees.  
Many countries use majority-based referenda to decide whether to undertake public projects, 
implement a policy change, or to accept a new law. Most US states, for example, add bond issues 
for schools or roads as “yes/no” items on the ballot of a general election. European countries have 
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issued national referenda to decide whether to join the European Union, accept European 
lawmaking, and a common currency. Referenda are also commonly employed on a local level, e.g. 
whether to accept a change in zoning restrictions, whether to build a nuclear plant in a certain 
municipality, whether to repurpose land (including demolishing houses) to allow for an 
infrastructure project, etc. This type of “direct democracy” is particularly prevalent in Switzerland 
where business hours, vacation duration, etc., are often settled by referendum. 
Majority voting is popular because of its many virtues.  It is transparent and easy to execute, 
it is based on a simple principle of equal participation and equal power (“one man, one vote”), and 
it induces voters to vote sincerely.  
However, majority voting is generally not efficient, as it only allows voters to indicate the 
alternative they prefer but not how intense their preference for that alterative is. In the examples 
above, it is typically the case that some voters care more about which outcome prevails than others. 
Changes in zoning laws might preclude some families from sending their kids to a good public 
school and cause the value of their homes to drop. Other families may simply be unaffected.   
Likewise, relaxing opening times in Zurich may be very valuable to store owners and a select 
group of shoppers while others may see little (or negative) value. The inherent weakness of 
majority voting lies in its failure to reflect the intensity of preferences: an almost indifferent 
majority prevails over an intense minority.  
Another important shortcoming of majority voting is that there is no compensation for those 
that lose. Lack of monetary compensation may seem natural for national (e.g. Presidential) 
elections but becomes problematic when voting is used to settle local issues. For example, when a 
change in zoning restrictions causes house values to drop, it seems unreasonably harsh not to 
compensate its owners.  
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A final shortcoming is that some groups may repeatedly lose under a majority-based rule. Lack 
of representation may cause a minority group to lose interest in participating in the democratic 
process with adverse effects for overall welfare. This possibility is commonly referred to as the 
“tyranny of the majority.” 
 
2. The environment 
Various proposals that aim to improve on majority voting have been put forward and are 
presented here. They all share some common assumptions about the environment in which they 
are implemented.  
2.1 The voters 
It is typically assumed that there is a finite number of voters, denoted by n. Some of the results 
in the literature depend on this number becoming very large. While this may be problematic when 
examining decisions in small groups, it does seem appropriate for national votes or even local 
referenda, where voters typically number in the thousands. Of course, it is not straightforward to 
determine what number of voters is “large enough.” Interestingly, many of the theoretical results 
are corroborated by lab experiments in which group sizes rarely exceed n = 15 voters. 
2.2 Issues and alternatives 
The simplest setup in which one can study voting systems is that of a single issue, d, with two 
possible alternatives: 𝑑 ∈ {𝑥, 𝑦} . Tractability favors such an environment as a testbed for 
alternative voting systems. Besides being more amenable to mathematical modeling and analysis, 
this “single issue – binary alternative” case is perhaps the most common environment in which 




2.3 Preferences and information 
Each voter i is assumed to assign values 𝑣𝑖(𝑥) and 𝑣𝑖(𝑦) to each of the alternatives, which 
represent her preference intensity. The larger the value, the larger the voter’s utility if the given 
alternative wins. These values can also be negative, representing disutility from a specific 
alternative. In fact, for the case of only two alternatives considered here, it is often assumed that 
each voter assigns a positive value to one alternative and its negative to the other: 𝑣𝑖(𝑥) =  −𝑣𝑖(𝑦). 
Given this assumption one can simply refer to the value as 𝑣𝑖 , where the sign determines the 
direction of preference: positive values indicate a preference for 𝑥, negative for 𝑦. Voters’ values 
are assumed to be i.i.d. draws from some distribution, 𝐹(𝑣), with density, 𝑓(𝑣), and voters know 
their own private values.  
An important factor when analyzing any voter system is the degree of knowledge voters have 
about others’ values. Common knowledge of values seems unrealistic. In fact, were this the case, 
no voting system would be necessary: a benevolent planner could simply pick the best alternative 
that maximizes ∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑖  and arrange for transfers between voters that compensate the losers.  
A more plausible assumption is that voters only know the distribution from which values are 
drawn, but not the actual draws. This is the environment in which most proposed alternatives to 
majority voting are evaluated theoretically and empirically – through lab experiments.  
A third possibility is the existence of aggregate uncertainty, where the distribution from which 
values are drawn is not known. That is, 𝑓(𝑣; 𝜃) may depend on some underlying unknown state 
of nature 𝜃 about which voters are imperfectly informed. 
 
3. Inefficiency of majority voting 
If we define 𝑤(𝑣) = ∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑖  then social welfare is given by: 
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𝑊(𝑣, 𝑑) = {
   𝑤(𝑣),
−𝑤(𝑣),
 𝑖𝑓 𝑑 = 𝑥
 𝑖𝑓 𝑑 = 𝑦
 
It is straightforward to see that the optimal decision 𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡 depends on the sign of the sum of values 
or, equivalently, the mean ?̅? =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑖 . In particular: 
𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡 = {
   𝑥                if  ?̅?  > 0
{𝑥, 𝑦}           if  ?̅?  = 0
   𝑦                if  ?̅? < 0
 
Under majority voting it is not the mean that determines the outcome. In fact, preference intensities 
do not play a role, only the number of voters supporting each alternative. Hence, it is the position 
of the median voter 𝑣𝑚𝑒𝑑 that becomes crucial. Since it is a dominant strategy to vote for one’s 
preferred alternative: 
𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑗 = {
   𝑥                if  𝑣𝑚𝑒𝑑  > 0
{𝑥, 𝑦}           if  𝑣𝑚𝑒𝑑  = 0
   𝑦                if  𝑣𝑚𝑒𝑑 < 0
 
The above expressions make clear that the positions of ?̅? and 𝑣𝑚𝑒𝑑 with respect to zero have 
important consequences. The position of the mean determines which alternative is socially 
optimal. The position of the median determines which alternative wins in a majority vote. 
Whenever the two are on the same side of zero, majority voting gives socially optimal results. 
When this is not true, majority voting fails completely. Assuming a symmetric value distribution, 
the probability that the latter happens is equal to2   






 − 1 ]  
Here 𝐸(𝑣2) = ∫ 𝑣2𝑓(𝑣)𝑑𝑣  and 𝐸(|𝑣|) = ∫ |𝑣|𝑓(𝑣)𝑑𝑣  with 𝐸(𝑣2) ≥ 𝐸(|𝑣|)2  by Jensen’s 
inequality. For instance, Prob(sign(?̅?) ≠ sign(𝑣𝑚𝑒𝑑))  is approximately 21% for normally 
distributed values and approximately 17% for uniformly distributed values. 
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Besides determining how often majority voting fails, it is important to measure the welfare 
consequences of such failures. Assuming a symmetric distribution of values around zero, Goeree 
and Li (2008) calculate the expected welfare under majority voting to be:  









The idea behind the calculation is that each voter creates a surplus of |𝑣| when 𝑚 ≥ (𝑛 − 1)/2 
others prefer the same alternative, and −|𝑣| when 𝑚 < (𝑛 − 1)/2 others do so. Since the event 
where 𝑚 others prefer the alternative is equally likely as the event that 𝑛 − 𝑚 − 1 others prefer it, 
all terms cancel out except for 𝑚 = (𝑛 − 1)/2.  
If instead the decision is made through some mechanism delivering an optimal outcome, then 
a voter with value 𝑣 generates a surplus of 𝑣 when the sum of others’ values is greater than – 𝑣. 
For n large, this occurs with probability 𝛷 (
𝑣
√𝑛−1
) where Φ(⋅) is the standard normal distribution. 
In all other cases the voter generates a surplus of – 𝑣. Expected welfare is thus given by:  
𝑊𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 = 𝑛 ∫ 𝑣 (2𝛷 (
𝑣
√𝑛 − 1






Goeree and Li (2008) show that, as the size of the electorate grows large, inefficiency persists and 










which is less than 1 by Jensen’s inequality. Moreover, the total surplus loss, i.e. the difference 
𝑊𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 − 𝑊𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔, diverges to infinity in the limit. 
An alternative voting system would ideally overcome this problem and give outcomes that are 
optimal for any value distribution. 
7 
 
4. Alternative voting mechanisms that reflect preference intensity  
Various mechanisms have been proposed to mitigate or eliminate voting inefficiencies by 
allowing the voters to express the strengths of their preferences. One can broadly distinguish three 
approaches: the use of storable votes, the introduction of markets for votes, and, inspired by the 
theory of mechanism design, the replacement of votes by bids. Each of these is reviewed in this 
section. The theoretical underpinnings are explained and experimental results from the lab are 
reported. 
4.1 Storable votes 
Often, collective decisions are not made in isolation. The same electorate or smaller groups of 
people need to make choices on different issues, either at the same time or in different points in 
time. One way to improve voting systems takes advantage of this characteristic by making votes 
“storable.” The idea is to allow voters to store votes through abstaining on some issues, presumably 
the ones they care less about, and use them on the issues about which they care more.  
The notion was introduced by Casella (2005). In her model, voters face a series of binary 
choices and are endowed with a budget of votes. To illustrate, suppose there are three voters and 
two binary issues: {𝑥1, 𝑦1} are the alternatives for issue 1 and {𝑥2, 𝑦2} are the alternatives for issue 
2. Voters’ preferences are represented by different private valuations for the alternatives as shown 
in Table 1 below, where both X and Y are positive.  (Where the payoff of losing is 0 rather than 
minus the value to be in line with previously published papers on storable voting.)    
The simple majority outcomes are 𝑦1 for issue 1 and 𝑦2 for issue 2. Under the storable votes 
mechanism, assuming ties are broken by the flip of a coin, there exists an equilibrium where voter 
1 casts 2 votes on issue 1 and voters 2 and 3 each mix with equal probability between casting 2 
votes on issue 1 and casting 1 vote on each issue. In this equilibrium, the outcomes 𝑥1 and 𝑥2 occur  
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Table 1. Voter preferences over two binary issues 
  Alternative Voter 1 Voter 2 Voter 3 
Issue 1 
 
7X 0 0 
  0 Y Y 
Issue 2 
 
X 0 0 
  
 





 and 𝑦1and 𝑦2with complementary probability. The net benefit of storable votes 
compared to majority voting is thus X – Y/2, which may be positive or negative depending on the 
relative sizes of X and Y.  When X > Y/2, storable votes result in an efficiency gain. But the 
equilibrium also applies when X is small, say 7X < 2Y, in which case the majority outcomes 𝑦1 
and 𝑦2 are socially optimal and storable votes cause efficiency to fall.  
While the welfare effects of storable votes are ambiguous in this example, Casella (2005) 
argues that they are generally positive if one of the following conditions holds: i) the number of 
voters is above a minimum threshold, ii) their preferences are not extremely polarized, and iii) 
there is a long time horizon.  
4.1.1. Experimental tests of storable voting 
In Casella’s model, voters know their own valuations for the current issue and the distribution 
about other voters’ current and future valuations and their own future valuations. Thus, voters need 
to solve a complicated dynamic game, comparing the marginal effect of an extra vote on the 
probability of being pivotal for the current issue, to its effect on the probability of being pivotal 
for the next issue.  
Would voters be able to solve such a complicated problem in practice? Casella and her 
coauthors tested a variation of this mechanism in laboratory experiments (Casella, Gelman, and 
Palfrey, 2006). The experiment consisted of 6 treatments: the committees of size 𝑛 ∈ {2,3,6} were 
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asked to cast votes across two or three issues.  In each session, subjects were randomly grouped 
every period with new value draws and played a total of 30 periods of the storable votes 
mechanism. In each period, voters were endowed with a “regular” vote that they must use in each 
issue and some “bonus” votes that they may cast in addition to the regular votes to express their 
strong preference. The efficiency-improvement over simple majority voting predicted by the 
theory were observed almost perfectly across all treatments even though the actual choice of 
subjects were substantially different from the equilibrium strategies. This is because, subjects 
followed approximately monotonic strategies. For instance, when faced with two issues, the 
number of bonus votes used on the first issue increased with voters’ preference intensities.  
Can storable votes help overcome the “tyranny of the majority”? If so, is it at the expense of 
the efficiency gain over majority voting?  Casella, Palfrey and Riezman (2008) show that storable 
votes can increase the power of minorities without sacrificing aggregate efficiency. This main 
theoretical finding is confirmed by a series of experiments.  
It is important to note that with storable votes the majority does not directly compensate the 
minority. Instead, the accumulation of a large number of votes by the minority allows it to “beat” 
the majority on the issues for which it has a strong preference. 
4.1.2 Extensions  
Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) and Hortala-Vallve (2012) generalize the “storable votes” 
idea to mechanisms where agents can effectively reflect their relative intensities and improve over 
majority rule by linking decisions across multiple dimensions through a common budget 
constraint.  
Engelmann and Grimm (2012) and Hortala-Vallve and Llorente-Saguer (2010) test the 
performance of these mechanisms in the lab and find that efficiency levels are improved as 
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predicted by theory. In Hortala-Vallve and Llorente-Saguer (2010), the experiment consisted of 
three treatments varying the number of issues. Two members of a committee are endowed with 6 
votes each that they can allocate across 𝐾 issues, where 𝐾 ∈ {2,3,6}. One member is always in 
favor and one is always opposed in all issues and the intensities of the preferences are realized 
draws from a uniform distribution. Members cast votes simultaneously on all issues after being 
told their private value draws for all issues but not the values for the other member. This is different 
from the storable votes model where voters only know the value for the current issue and voting 
is done sequentially, issue by issue. Efficiency under this mechanism is predicted to be increasing 
in 𝐾 and above 80%. The realized experimental efficiency tracked this prediction well as a vast 
majority of the subjects used monotonic strategies.  
4.2 Markets for votes 
Markets that allow for the free trade of goods generally lead to efficient outcomes. Can their 
power be used to obtain more efficient outcomes when making collective choices? While the idea 
of trading votes in the same way as a simple commodity is generally not viewed favorably, several 
scholars have argued that it should not be dismissed (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Coleman, 1966; 
Haefele, 1971; Mueller, 1973). Voters that care more for an issue would buy more votes from 
voters that care less about it and are therefore willing to sell. Voters becoming traders means they 
can express their preference intensity, thus leading to more efficient outcomes.  
This view has been challenged by pointing out that votes are not simple goods: they involve 
externalities. While a trade might be beneficial for the voters involved, it may be detrimental for 
overall efficiency (Riker and Brams, 1973). Early experimental tests of this hypothesis lend some 




Table 2. Voter preferences that lead to non-existence of CE 
  Alternative Voter 1 Voter 2 Voter 3 
Issue 1 𝑥 30 0 0 
 𝑦 0 10 12 
 
This earlier work mainly focused on legislatures where informal vote trading (known as 
“logrolling”) is a common phenomenon that is facilitated by the frequent voting over a variety of 
issues.3 More recently, scholars examined the idea of vote-markets that could be used in single-
issue votes such as local or national referenda. One important issue in such markets is that a 
competitive equilibrium (CE) may not exist (Ferejohn, 1974; Philipson and Snyder, 1996). This is 
illustrated by the example in Table 2 above (where the payoff of losing is 0 instead of minus the 
value to be in line with previously published papers).  
The simple majority outcome is 𝑦 whereas the efficient outcome is 𝑥. Voter 1 demands at 
most one vote at any positive price. Voter 1 can buy voter 2’s vote at price of 11. But the market 
will not clear because voter 3’s vote now is worth nothing and therefore voter 3 is willing to sell 
it at any positive price. There will be excessive supply driving the price down to 0. But a price of 
0 cannot be an equilibrium because neither voter 2 nor voter 3 will be willing to sell a vote so 
there is excessive demand of 1 vote from voter 1.  
4.2.1 Experimental tests of vote markets 
Casella, Llorente-Saguer, and Palfrey (2012) proposed the “ex-ante competitive equilibrium” 
notion for such vote markets which allow the possibility that markets will not clear exactly. The 
equilibrium condition does not require supply to equal demand with probability one, but instead 
requires market clearing in expectation. Ex post, the market is cleared through a rationing rule. 
The existence of such an equilibrium is proved by construction. In any equilibrium with trade 
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there is a dictator – a voter owning more than half of the votes. The dictator will be the voter with 
the highest or the next-to-highest value draw. However, unless the dictator’s value is 
overwhelmingly large, or there is some correlation between preferences and intensities, this 
equilibrium will not generally be efficient. In fact, it generates significant welfare losses relative 
to simple majority voting.  
Casella et al. (2012) collect experimental data to test their theoretical predictions. As is the 
case with competitive equilibrium notions for traditional markets, the definition of “ex-ante 
competitive equilibrium” for vote markets does not specify a particular trading protocol. In the 
lab, the authors have participants trade in a continuous double auction, which is perhaps the most 
common format in market experiments and typically results in prices and allocations that closely 
adhere to theoretical predictions (Friedman, 1993). Significant overpricing (with respect to 
equilibrium prices) is observed in the experimental vote markets. This is reduced with experience 
and prices converge to levels that can be explained by allowing for voters being risk averse. The 
intuition is that risk averse voters assign a higher value to votes as they can get a sure outcome if 
they buy enough of them.  
Concerning the emergence of dictators, the evidence from the experiment is mixed. In smaller 
markets (𝑛 = 5) the voters with the highest preference intensity buy more than half votes in about 
62% of rounds. This tends to happen more often in later rounds. In larger markets (𝑛 = 9), 
dictators are observed only in about 10% of all rounds. Again this increases in later rounds, going 
up to 20% in the last round. Despite the deviations from equilibrium, welfare in the experimental 
vote markets is typically lower than what could be achieved by majority voting (albeit not as bad 
as predicted by the equilibrium analysis). 
Do vote markets help intense minorities to win more often? Casella, Palfrey and Turban 
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(2014) compared the vote-trading outcomes and efficiency when vote-trading is coordinated by 
group leaders and when vote-trading takes place in competitive market. The main theoretical 
results highlight the tradeoff between increasing minority voice and efficiency. With market 
trades, vote trading can be welfare reducing because the minority wins too often. With group 
leaders, vote trading improves over no-trade, but still falls short of full efficiency because the 
minority does not win frequently enough. These predictions are tested in a set of lab experiments 
and the results strongly support them.   
In terms of compensation for the losers, vote markets offer a direct way for it to happen. 
Voters can get compensated by selling their vote. Nevertheless, such compensation is unlikely to 
be fair. If everyone starts off with one vote and sells it at the market price, then for compensation 
to be proportional to a loser’s preference intensity it must be the case that the probability of selling 
must be increasing to said intensity. It is hard to imagine a market where this happens in 
equilibrium. For any given price, one would expect voters with lower intensities to be the ones 
more willing to sell their vote, as they have “less to lose”.  To conclude, markets for votes do not 
appear to have the same appeal as those for standard goods.4  
4.3 Replacing votes with bids 
Inspired by the success of mechanism design to come up with games that implement desired 
outcomes in a variety of economic environments, several scholars have explored the possibility 
to use this idea in the context of elections. In broad terms, the idea is to allow voters to indicate 
an amount they are willing to pay for their preferred alternative to be implemented or by how 
much they need to be compensated in case it does not. The mechanism then would determine the 
outcome based on these “bids” and also indicate appropriate transfers. Ideally, the outcome will 
be efficient, and the transfers will adequately compensate the loser.  
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4.3.1 Linear voting 
The first to explore this idea is Smith (1977) who proposed a direct mechanism that he dubbed 
the “auction election” (which later became the “compensation election”). This mechanism was 
independently rediscovered by Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002) who were the first to provide 
a thorough equilibrium analysis. Voters submit a single bid for one of two alternatives. The 
alternative with the largest total bid is implemented. Those that win pay their bids and those that 
lose get paid their (own) bids. Because payments are linear in bids, we refer to this mechanism 
as “linear voting.” 
Smith (1977) does not specify what happens with the surplus money when the sum of winning 
bids exceeds the sum of losing bids.  Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002), in contrast, balance 
the budget by rebating to all bidders an equal share of the money surplus.  Another difference is 
that Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein allow voters to indicate a preferred outcome besides making a 
monetary bid.   
Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002) show that, with complete information about voters’ 
values, the election ends up in a tie but the additional information about voters’ preferred 
outcomes can be used to break the tie efficiently.  In other words, linear voting is efficient in a 
complete information environment.  
Veszteg (2010) extends the analysis to incomplete information environments. He shows that 
when voters’ values are privately known, and symmetrically distributed, Bayes-Nash equilibrium 
bids are increasing in value and the resulting outcome is efficient with two voters. No analytic 
solutions exist for more than two voters, but in the limit when the number of voters grows large, 




Figure 1. A symmetric (top) and asymmetric (bottom) electorate with only two types. In the 
symmetric case, there is no ex ante winner. For the asymmetric case, implementing right is 
socially optimal since 𝑋 > 1. 
 
The positive results for the incomplete-information case apply when values are symmetrically 
distributed around zero, but not necessarily when there are value asymmetries. To illustrate the 
difference, consider a simple setup with only two types 𝑣 ∈ {−1, 𝑋}, that are either symmetric 
(𝑋 = 1) or asymmetric (𝑋 > 1), illustrated in Figure 1 above. For the case shown in the top line 
of Figure 1, there is no ex ante winner. For the case shown in the bottom line of Figure 1, it is 
socially optimal to implement right since 𝑋 > 1. 
Assuming a type symmetric equilibrium, there are two bids, 𝑏(−1)  and 𝑏(𝑋) , to be 
determined.  When the electorate size, n, gets large, the payoff of a voter with value 𝑣 ∈ {−1, 𝑋} 
who bids 𝑏 can be approximated as (recall a voter receives −𝑣 when losing plus her own bid)  
𝜋(𝑣, 𝑏) = (𝑣 − 𝑏)(2Φ (
𝑏 + 𝑛𝜇
√𝑛𝜎
) − 1) 
which yields the first-order condition 

















(𝑏(−1) + 𝑏(𝑋)) and 𝜎2 =
1
2
(𝑏(−1)2 + 𝑏(𝑋)2) − 𝜇2.  
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For the symmetric case with 𝑋 = 1, the optimal bids are 𝑏(−1) = −
1
2
 and 𝑏(1) =
1
2
 so that 
𝑛𝜇 = 0 while √𝑛𝜎 diverges as 𝑛 grows large. The selected outcome will be the one that receives 
more bids, which is efficient (as would majority voting be in this symmetric two-type case).  For 
the asymmetric case with 𝑋 > 1, the optimal bids are, to first order, 𝑏(−1) = −
1
4




(𝑋 + 1), where we ignore terms of order 
1
𝑛




√𝑛𝜎 diverges when 𝑛 grows large.  Again, the outcome is determined by the number of voters 
on each side (as in majority voting), which is not efficient as right has a higher expected value. 
4.3.2 Experimental tests of linear voting 
Oprea, Smith, and Winn (2007) tested the linear voting mechanism in a laboratory experiment 
that varied the size of the electorate (18 versus 6) and the distribution of the voters’ private values 
(resulting in even, close, or landslide elections). They report that there is a positive relationship 
between bids and values in all treatments and the observed bid function was roughly linear. While 
this finding is encouraging with respect to the efficiency of outcomes, their design did not allow 
for a comparison between the compensation election and majority voting. A second encouraging 
finding is that they did not find evidence of “off-preference bid-behavior”, i.e. voters biding more 
than their value or against their preferred outcome. Such behavior is undesirable as voters may 
end up making monetary losses.  
Perez-Castrillo and Veszteg (2007) conducted experiments to test the linear bidding 
mechanism in a symmetric incomplete-information environment with group sizes of 2, 8, and 10. 
They find that the linear bidding mechanism is efficient in 75% of all the cases. With only two 
voters, a large faction of the subjects played according to the Bayes-Nash equilibrium identified 
in Veszteg (2010) while others used the safe maximin strategy (bidding half one’s value) that 
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ensures equal payoffs for losing and winning.  For larger group sizes, the experiments do not 
provide conclusive evidence for Bayes-Nash equilibrium behavior.   
4.3.3 Quadratic voting 
Goeree and Zhang (2017) and Lalley and Weyl (2018) independently proposed a mechanism 
where voters can express the intensity of their preference by buying votes at a quadratic cost. 
Weyl termed this mechanism “quadratic voting.”   
The intuition for using quadratic costs is that in a large electorate, the impact of a bid on the 
probability that the preferred outcome is selected is small, and, hence, approximately linear in the 
bid. As a result, the marginal benefit of raising one’s bid is proportional to one’s value. With a 
quadratic payment rule the marginal cost is linear in the bid. Equating the marginal cost and 
benefit yields optimal bids that are proportional to value. And when bids are proportional to value, 
the alternative with the largest total bid is also the one with the larges total value: bidding is 
efficient in the limit. 
Goeree and Zhang (2017) formalize this intuition by deriving quadratic voting as the limit 
(for large 𝑛 ) of the well-known AGV “expected externality” mechanism. 5  They show that 
quadratic voting inherits several useful properties from the AGV mechanism: it is budget-
balanced, individually rational, and fully efficient in the limit. And the rebate, introduced to make 
the mechanism budget-balanced, offers compensation to losing bidders.  
Goeree and Zhang (2017) derive these positive results for the symmetric case, which begs 
the question what happens in the presence of value asymmetries. Lalley and Weyl (2018) study 
quadratic voting in general asymmetric settings, i.e. with non-zero mean, for which the 
equilibrium is much harder to characterize. To illustrate, consider again the asymmetric setup in 




Figure 2. The first-order conditions for 𝑏(−1) and 𝑏(𝑋) have unique solutions around 𝑏 = 0 for 
𝑛 < 𝑛∗ but multiple solutions exist for 𝑏(−1) when 𝑛 > 𝑛∗.  
 
with value 𝑣 ∈ {−1, 𝑋} who makes a bid 𝑏 can be approximated as 
𝜋(𝑣, 𝑏) = 𝑣 (2Φ (
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with, as before, 𝜇 =
1
2
(𝑏(−1) + 𝑏(𝑋)) and 𝜎2 =
1
2
(𝑏(−1)2 + 𝑏(𝑋)2) − 𝜇2.  
For the symmetric case with 𝑋 = 1, the optimal bids are 𝑏(−1) = −(2𝜋𝑛)−
1
4 and 𝑏(1) =
(2𝜋𝑛)−
1
4. The selected outcome is the one that receives more bids, which is efficient (as would 
majority voting be in this symmetric two-type case). For the asymmetric case with 𝑋 > 1, the 
optimal bids differ across two regimes that are characterized by a critical electorate size 𝑛∗. 
For 𝑛 < 𝑛∗, the solutions to the first-order conditions for 𝑏(−1) and 𝑏(𝑋) are unique.  It 
can be shown that, in equilibrium, the ratio 𝜌 =  −
𝑏(−1)
𝑏(𝑋)














Figure 3. Payoff of the left voter with value 𝑣 = −1 as a function of her bid 𝑏 for various values 
of 𝑛.  When 𝑛 < 𝑛∗ the optimal bid is unique and small (i.e. close to 0), see the leftmost panel.  
When 𝑛 > 𝑛∗, there are two local maxima and one local minimum that correspond to the disks 
and circle respectively in Figure 2. When the local maxima yield equal payoffs, the left voter is 
indifferent between the small and large bids, see the third and fourth panels. The chance of a large 
bid falls with 𝑛 but it occurs just frequently enough, i.e. it creates enough variance in the win 
probability, to make others’ bids be of order 
1
𝑛
. The final panel shows the limit case for 𝑛 → ∞.   
 
which implies 0 < 𝜌 < 1 so quadratic voting is efficient. However, as can be seen from Figure 
2, the equilibrium bids are determined by the exponential tail of the normal density and fall fast 
with 𝑛, pulling the mean 𝜇 to 0 as 𝑛 grows large.   
For 𝑛 > 𝑛∗, there are multiple solutions to the first-order conditions, see Figure 2. Now the 
approximate equilibrium bids are 𝑏(𝑋) = 4𝑋/(𝑛(𝑋 − 1)) while 𝑏(−1) = −4/(𝑛(𝑋 − 1)) with 
probability 1 − 𝜖 and 𝑏(−1) = −2 with probability 𝜖. Here 𝜖 vanishes when 𝑛 grows large but 




Figure 3 shows the expected payoff for a left voter with value 𝑣 = −1 as a function of her 
bid. For 𝑛 < 𝑛∗, the payoff is single peaked, and the equilibrium bid is unique.  For 𝑛 > 𝑛∗, the 
payoff has two local maxima and one local minimum, which correspond to the disks and circle 
in Figure 2 respectively.  For 𝑛 large enough, the payoff of the large bid becomes equal to that of 
a small bid (third and fourth panels of Figure 3), in which case the left voter mixes between a 
small and large bid, with probabilities 𝜖 and 1 − 𝜖 respectively. In other words, the left voter 
occasionally “buys the election.” However, 𝜖 falls with 𝑛, so quadratic voting is efficient in the 
limit when the electorate size diverges, also when voters’ values are asymmetrically distributed. 
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Note that quadratic voting mechanism results in little to no compensation in equilibrium when 
electorates grow large. The mechanism is budget balanced as it redistributes any money surplus 




.    
4.3.4 Experimental tests of quadratic voting 
The quadratic voting mechanism is not just of theoretical interest but is also simple enough 
to work in practice. Goeree and Zhang (2017) tested the quadratic voting mechanism in the 
laboratory and compared its performance to majority voting. The experiments employ a setup 
with “moderate” (low-value) and “extremist” (high-value) voters who are equally likely to prefer 
one of two alternatives. In the first twenty periods of the experiment, subjects make choices under 
both the bidding and voting mechanism. Then they collectively choose whether the bidding or 
voting mechanism applies in the final twenty periods of the experiment. With 𝑛 = 11, 90% of 
the groups (18 out of 20) opt for the bidding mechanism. Asked to explain their choice, the 
subjects said they liked getting the cash rebate, and they had a greater sense of control the 
outcome. With standard voting they said they felt it was very unlikely their vote would be pivotal. 
An additional benefit of this experimental design is that subjects have ample opportunity to 
learn in the first part, which makes equilibrium behavior in the second part more likely. Goeree 
and Zhang (2017) find that voting is near-perfect in this second part: only 0.7% of all votes are 
“mistakes” that go against the preferred alternative. As a result, observed efficiency losses under 
voting are as theory predicts: 22% on average with a group size of three and 28% with a group 
size of eleven. Observed efficiency losses are much smaller under the bidding mechanism: 7% 




5. Practical and other issues 
A planner wishing to implement any of the mentioned mechanisms in practice would need to 
overcome a series of issues that theorists can abstract away from and experimentalists can avoid 
through design. These are related to issues of feasibility in specific environments, as well as 
objections of a moral nature to some of the schemes proposed. 
In the case of storable votes, while the approach looks promising, its main limitation in terms 
of applicability in real collective choice scenarios is the necessity to link different issues together. 
Casella (2005) considers this system as a viable alternative for decision making in the European 
Union, where member countries need to make decisions through vote repeatedly and with a 
relatively high frequency. Alas, this is not always the case. In other setups decisions are often one-
off events and it is hard to predict when and if there will be a similar situation in the near future. 
One such example is the Brexit referendum. Even in cases where local referenda are more frequent, 
other issues need to be addressed. Demographic changes mean that the electorate is not fixed across 
time, which adds more layers of complexity to the voters’ decision of whether or not to store their 
vote. A different issue is the possibility for strategic agenda setting. Whoever controls the order in 
which the issues are put to vote across time may do so in a way that favors her preferred outcomes. 
While these limitations hamper the use of storable votes in many scenarios, it remains a viable 
alternative to majority voting in many settings. 
Markets for votes do not face significant hurdles in way of practical application. Today’s 
technology offers tools to setup online markets for a range of goods and services. Furthermore, 
there have been significant advancements in the development of smart contracts, with the use of 
technologies such as blockchain, that can help avoid issues of multiple voting. On the other hand, 
vote markets often raise objections on moral grounds.  The issues raised with respect to this 
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approach are of a more philosophical nature. The kneejerk reaction to a proposal to allow for the 
buying and selling of votes is that this gives too much power to the wealthiest members of society.6 
In some contexts, such as corporate governance, one would not expect these objections to be 
relevant. Overall though, it seems unlikely for vote markets to become a standard feature of 
collective choice making.  
As with vote markets, bidding for votes, i.e. linear or quadratic voting, also seems to be well 
within the capabilities of modern technology. At first sight, one might also object to such bidding 
schemes for the same reason as for vote markets. Namely, that they give too much power to the 
rich members of society. However, there is reason to question this argument, as the mechanisms 
do impose indirect restrictions to avoid such a possibility. “Buying” the election can be overly 
costly, especially in the case of quadratic voting where the cost of extra votes is increasing. In 
fact, laboratory data in Goeree and Zhang (2017) shows that moderate voters benefit most under 
quadratic voting compared to majority voting. In linear voting, voters can insure themselves 
against a loss through their bid and make sure they receive adequate compensation. At the same 
time, all proceeds are redistributed, which further enhances equity.  
Quadratic voting faces another potential criticism, namely that people might collude and buy 
votes from fellow supporters of the same alternative to increase their side’s total vote tally. 
Consider an extreme voter who buys 100 votes in equilibrium and pays (something proportional 
to) 10,000 as a result. If this extreme voter would instead buy only 10 votes and convince 99 
others to do the same (paid for by the extreme voter) then the total number of votes would be a 
1,000 while the cost would be the same. Weyl (2017) provides three reasons why the impact of 
collusion on the efficiency of the bidding mechanism is small in large electorates: (i) the collusive 
group must be large, (ii) individual members of large collusive groups have strong incentives to 
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deviate from the collusive agreement, and (iii) large collusive groups provoke strong reactions 
from the rest of the electorate. It is important to note that this criticism does not apply to the linear 
voting mechanism. 
 
6. Extensions and outlook 
The first goal of any alternative to majority voting would be to improve efficiency by 
delivering outcomes in a way that accounts for voters’ preference intensities. From the discussion 
above it becomes clear that both the storable votes and especially the ‘bids instead of votes’ 
approaches show some promise with respect to this point. Storable votes allow this by letting 
voters to store their votes on issues that are not important to them and cast them on the ones they 
care most about. While not achieving full efficiency, this approach has the potential to improve 
efficiency with respect to majority voting outcomes in some cases. Bidding mechanisms allow 
voters to directly express their preference intensity on any issue they vote upon. As long as voters 
bid proportionally to their preference intensity, such a mechanism could deliver full efficiency. 
In fact, this is the equilibrium prediction for quadratic voting, as well as for linear voting under 
preferences that are symmetrically distributed around zero. On the other hand, vote markets offer 
no guarantee of delivering more efficient outcomes. In equilibrium, only the voters with the most 
intense preferences determine the outcome. All others’ preferences do not matter. 
The second goal of an alternative voting mechanism is to avoid the tyranny of the 
majority. All the approaches discussed manage to avoid this problem, even if this sometimes 
happens at the expense of efficiency. Storable votes and vote markets still rely on the machinery 
of majority voting for delivering the final outcome. But the mechanisms allow for a redistribution 
of votes across issues or voters, the ex-ante majority of voters and the majority of vote holders at 
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the time of the vote do not coincide. Both linear and quadratic voting dispense of majority voting 
entirely, freeing minorities from the majority’s hold. 
In terms of compensation for losing voters, it is necessary to make a distinction between 
whether the mechanism allows for, or even requires, monetary transfers between voters and the 
degree to which this happens in the theoretical equilibrium. The storable votes mechanism makes 
no provision for it. In vote markets, voters can receive some compensation by selling their vote. 
Notice however that in equilibrium this is expected to be decreasing in the size of the electorate 
and therefore become negligible for large electorates. Another interesting point related to this is 
that compensation in vote markets is not limited to voters on the losing side, as anyone is allowed 
to sell their vote and almost everyone does so in equilibrium. Quadratic voting also includes some 
compensation for all voters, irrespective of their preference, as all proceeds are redistributed 
equally across voters. Unfortunately, with large electorates, as bids decrease with its size, the 
equilibrium proceeds of the mechanism are very small and there is no effective redistribution and 
compensation. Linear voting also includes redistribution of earnings, but more importantly, 
provides for direct compensation of losers. Furthermore, in equilibrium this compensation 
remains substantial, see Table 3 below for an overview. 
If efficiency is considered the most important criterion, quadratic voting scores best 
among the mechanisms considered here.  For large electorates, it is efficient when values are 
symmetrically or asymmetrically distributed.  However, it is important to qualify that, thus far, 
we have considered environments without any aggregate uncertainty. The distribution of values 
is commonly known and, hence, with a large electorate, the optimal outcome is known.  If given 
the authority, a benevolent planner could simply implement the optimal outcome. In other words, 
the election merely ratifies what is commonly known to be the best outcome. 
25 
 
Table 3. Comparing various mechanisms with majority voting along three main criteria. 
Mechanism 
1. Improving efficiency 2. Avoiding  
“tyranny of the 
majority” 









Storable votes +/- +/- + - - 
Vote markets - - + + 0 
Linear voting + 0 + + + 
Quadratic voting + + + + 0 
 
A more realistic setup is where voters face some uncertainty about the socially optimal 
outcome. A simple example is shown in Figure 4.  There are four possible states of nature: two 
are symmetric, i.e. both left and right voters’ intensities are either 1 or X, and two are asymmetric, 




 In a symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium, 𝑏(−1) = −𝑏(1) and 𝑏(−𝑋) = −𝑏(𝑋), so that 
𝜇11 = 𝜇𝑋𝑋 = 0, 𝜎11 = 𝑏(1) and 𝜎𝑋𝑋 = 𝑏(𝑋).  The first-order conditions are 








































(In this equilibrium, |
𝑛𝜇1𝑋
√𝑛𝜎1𝑋
| diverges, so only the first terms on the right side of the first-order 




Figure 4. A setup with aggregate uncertainty. There are four possible states, two symmetric and 
two asymmetric, with prior probabilities shown on the right. We assume that 𝑋 > 1, so that the 





Specifically, in the symmetric states, the equilibrium is efficient and welfare gains are of the order 
√𝑛. However, in the asymmetric states, 𝑏(𝑋) < 𝑏(1), because the voter with intensity 1 puts a 
higher probability on the symmetric state 𝜔11  than the voter with intensity 𝑋  puts on the 
symmetric state 𝜔𝑋𝑋.  As a result, the “weaker” voter bids more than the “stronger” one and the 
equilibrium outcome is the wrong one causing losses of the order 𝑛.7  In other words, quadratic 
voting is not necessarily efficient in the realistic case when voters face aggregate uncertainty.8   
 Research on improving voting systems has just scratched the surface of possible 
alternatives. No clear “winner” has emerged so far, and additional theoretical analysis and 
empirical testing are needed to design a mechanism that robustly produces efficient and equitable 
outcomes.  Improving voting systems is an exciting application of market design, with potentially 
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